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Abstract: 
Different firms issue earnings guidance at dramatically different rates. We suggest 
that frequent guiders more likely represent a type of firm that is attempting to develop a 
reputation for enhanced disclosures through their guidance issuances. Furthermore, the 
desire to build a reputation and the opportunities to learn provided by issuing more 
frequent guidance should translate into frequent guiders providing higher quality 
guidance than occasional guiders. We examine our hypotheses in three stages. First, we 
find that guidance frequency is positively correlated with variables associated with 
reputation with capital market participants and reputation in product and labor markets. 
Second, our cross-sectional analysis shows that frequent guiders provide guidance that is 
more accurate and specific, timelier, and less optimistically biased. Third, controlling for 
overall time trends, we find that firms display improvements over time in their guidance 
properties. Overall, our results are consistent with the reputation-building and learning-
by-doing arguments. 
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I. Introduction 
Prior research has examined several aspects of earnings guidance including 
factors that influence the propensity to issue guidance, properties of the guidance issued, 
analysts’ and market responses to guidance, and reasons why firms stop issuing 
guidance. 1  Little is known, however, about the extent to which a firm’s guidance 
frequency is related to the properties of the guidance issued. In this paper, we argue that 
guidance frequency is an important variable for two reasons: reputation-building and 
learning-by-doing. We suggest that frequent guiders are more likely to represent a type of 
firm that is attempting to develop a reputation for enhanced disclosures through their 
guidance issuances. Consistent with this view, 92% of surveyed CFOs state that 
developing a reputation for transparent reporting is the key factor motivating voluntary 
disclosures (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). As a consequence of the desire to 
build a reputation, frequent guiders are likely to expend greater time and resources on the 
guidance effort, which in turn will affect the properties of the guidance.2 In addition, 
frequent guiders enjoy the benefits of learning-by-doing, and therefore are likely to have 
forecast properties that are different from occasional guiders, and their guidance 
properties are also likely to evolve over time. Classifying based on guidance frequency 
also furthers our understanding of the conflicting results documented in prior studies on 
whether firms guide to disclose good news or bad news.   
                                                 
1 We define earnings guidance as all management earnings forecasts issued after the start of and before the 
end of a fiscal quarter. See Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman (2008) for a recent review of the literature on 
management earnings forecasts. 
2 The choice of firm type (frequent vs. occasional) is influenced by several factors including the manager’s 
ability to generate high quality guidance and the cost of developing processes to provide guidance (which 
are affected by the size of the firm, volatility of earnings, etc.). These factors are discussed in more detail in 
section 2. 
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Reputation is the outcome of a competitive process in which firms signal their key 
characteristics to different constituents to maximize their social status (Spence 1974). 
These constituents include current stakeholders (i.e. customers, employees, investors, 
suppliers) and other players such as analysts, regulators, and the media (Fombrun and 
Shanley 1990).3 While a firm’s reputation is multi-dimensional, reputation in our setting 
is disclosure transparency by issuing guidance. Prior research shows that establishing a 
guidance reputation enhances management credibility, which allows guidance news to be 
more quickly impounded into analysts’ stock revisions and stock prices (Williams 1996; 
Hutton and Stocken 2009). Firms with more transparent disclosures also attract greater 
analyst coverage and institutional ownership (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Bushee and Noe 
2000). However, despite the benefits, reputation-building and maintenance can be costly 
(Wilson 1985). Survey evidence suggests that firms desirous of building a reputation for 
transparency are likely to expend greater resources (primarily in the form of managerial 
and employee time and effort) on the guidance process (McKinsey 2006). In addition to 
investing in reputation-building, firms are also likely to benefit from repetition and 
feedback from providing guidance. Prior research shows that learning occurs through the 
experience of performing a task when the frequency and immediacy of feedback are high 
(Arrow 1962; Huber 1991; Zollo and Winter 2002). Both the reputation-building and 
learning factors should translate into frequent guiders issuing guidance with properties 
                                                 
3 Reputation is an important concept that has been studied extensively in several streams of literature. Early 
economic theories define reputation as the updated assessment of a player’s signal or trait (Kreps and 
Wilson 1982; Milgrom and Roberts 1982; Wilson 1985; Diamond 1989). In marketing, reputation is used 
interchangeably with image, identity, and brand (Fombrun and Van Riel 1997). In management, reputation 
is rooted in the sense-making of employees and the firm’s self-image affects how it interacts with external 
stakeholders to establish an overall corporate reputation (Lange, Lee, and Dai 2010).   
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that are systematically different from those issued by occasional guiders who do not have 
the opportunity to practice and learn.  
We test our theory in three stages. We first validate guidance frequency as a 
proxy for a desire to build a reputation for reporting transparency by testing whether it is 
correlated with variables associated with reputation with capital market participants  and 
indicators of a firm’s overall concern for public reputation that have been studied in 
research on product and labor markets (Fornell, Johnson, Anderson, Cha, and Bryant 
1996; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005; Feng, Li, and 
McVay 2009; Edmans 2011). The results from this analysis suggest that guidance 
frequency is associated with greater institutional ownership, greater analyst following, 
lower analyst dispersion, and a lower likelihood of reporting internal control weaknesses. 
Frequent guiders also score higher on the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) 
and are more likely to be on Fortune’s list of “100 Best Companies to Work For.” This 
suggests that frequent guidance is part of a strategy aimed at reputation-building. 
We then analyze the association between guidance frequency and guidance 
properties and provide results that are consistent with the reputation and learning 
arguments. We find that firms that guide more frequently provide guidance earlier in the 
period, with lower error, less optimistic bias, and more specificity than occasional 
guiders. 4  We also examine whether reputation-building affects firms’ propensity to 
disclose good and bad news. Prior work suggests that firms often disclose bad news to 
prevent litigation (Skinner 1994). However, frequent guiders, motivated by the desire to 
                                                 
4 We define precision as the range-width of guidance and specificity as an ordinal variable that gives the 
highest value to the most specific guidance form. Point, range, open-ended, and qualitative guidance 
issuances are coded as 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively. 
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build or maintain a reputation for transparency are likely not to limit themselves to 
disclosures aimed at reducing litigation but also focus on trying to better inform capital 
markets. We find that frequent guiders are more likely to issue both good and bad news 
guidance compared to occasional guiders who are significantly more likely to disclose 
only bad news. However, the ratio of good to bad news issuances for frequent guiders 
suggests that these firms are still more likely to disclose bad news than good news. These 
results are robust to a two-stage least squares analysis that controls for various firm 
characteristics correlated with guidance properties. 
The discussion so far has focused on what can be determined by comparing 
frequent guiders to occasional guiders. While both the reputation and learning arguments 
suggest that guidance properties should differ for frequent and occasional guiders, only 
the learning hypothesis suggests that guidance properties should improve over time with 
experience.5  Therefore, we also conduct within-firm time-series analyses to examine 
whether learning occurs over time as guidance experience increases. Consistent with the 
effect of learning, we find that firms’ guidance issuances become more accurate, less 
optimistically biased, more specific, and more timely using a traditional Heckman two-
stage selection model that controls for the propensity to issue guidance. The results of 
this analysis support the idea that the guidance properties of frequent guiders are 
attributable in part to learning over time.   
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we provide 
evidence that the desire to build a reputation for transparent disclosure is one aspect of a 
                                                 
5 The reputation hypothesis argues that frequent guiders will provide guidance with different properties 
than occasional guiders to build a favorable reputation, but does not imply that their guidance properties 
will improve over time compared with their own past guidance issuances. 
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firm’s overall strategy to build a favorable reputation with its different constituents. 
Guidance frequency, our proxy for reputation-building through guidance, is positively 
associated with customer and employee satisfaction, analysts’ information environments, 
and institutional ownership, and negatively associated with internal control weaknesses. 
Second, we examine whether the properties of guidance vary based on whether a firm 
reveals a preference towards developing a reputation for greater disclosure through 
frequent guidance.6 Therefore, we complement contemporaneous work by Hutton and 
Stocken (2009) which provides evidence that the investor reaction to guidance news is 
affected by the accuracy and frequency of recent prior guidance. While their study 
provides evidence of the benefits of having a guidance reputation, we complement their 
study by showing the process through which firms attempt to build such a reputation, 
which is by issuing more accurate, specific, timely, and less optimistically biased 
guidance. Third, we argue that in addition to reputation-building, repetition and learning-
by-doing are important factors that affect guidance properties. We find that firms’ 
guidance properties evolve over time. This result supports practitioners’ claims that 
forecasting is a rolling process which organizations must constantly adapt to and learn 
from (Hope 2006) as well as theoretical work on the determinants of organizational 
learning. Lastly, using the reputation-building and learning arguments and focusing on 
guidance properties allows us to reconcile conflicting results in past work on whether 
firms guide to disclose good news or bad news. For example, early work on guidance 
                                                 
6 In their review of the literature on management forecasts, Hirst et al. (2008) highlight the lack of research 
on the determinants of firms’ guidance choices. They also argue that more multi-period studies on 
management guidance will further our understanding of firms’ guidance choices since the outcome of 
guidance issuance in the current period becomes the antecedent for subsequent periods. 
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found that firms are more likely to issue good news guidance (e.g. Patell 1976; Penman 
1980; Lev and Penman 1990) while more recent work has documented a greater 
likelihood of guidance in the face of bad news (e.g., Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper 
1994; Skinner 1994; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Skinner 1997). Our results show that, 
compared to occasional guiders, frequent guiders are more likely to issue good news 
guidance. However, the likelihood of bad news (to good news) issuances is still higher 
for both frequent and occasional guiders, consistent with litigation concerns contributing 
to decisions by both groups.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the 
background literature and develops the empirical predictions. Section three describes the 
data and sample selection. Section four defines the variables and provides results of the 
association tests between guidance frequency and measures of reputation while section 
five provides the results of the association tests between guidance frequency and 
guidance properties. Section six examines whether firms exhibit learning in the properties 
of the guidance issued and section seven summarizes the paper. 
2. Prior Research and Empirical Predictions 
2.1 Guidance Frequency and Disclosure Reputation 
We suggest that frequent guiders, through their revealed preference for issuing 
guidance, represent a class of firms that seeks to build a reputation for enhanced 
disclosure. 7  Research and anecdotal evidence suggest that building a reputation for 
enhanced disclosure is beneficial to a firm. Hutton and Stocken (2009) provide evidence 
                                                 
7 The concept of reputation-building is different from commitment. Wilson (1985) suggests that a key 
ingredient of reputation is an inability to commit in advance to a strategy. Each period players optimize 
their strategy over the rest of the periods based on the reputation built until that period.  
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that the investor reaction to guidance news is affected by the accuracy and frequency of 
recent prior guidance. Firms with more transparent disclosures also attract greater analyst 
following and institutional investors (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Bushee and Noe 2000; 
Ajinkya et al. 2005). In addition, establishing such a reputation could result in reduced 
information asymmetries with capital market participants and lower forecast dispersion 
among analysts (King, Pownall, and Waymire 1990). Similarly, a McKinsey (2006) 
survey found that perceived benefits of providing guidance include maintaining a channel 
of communication with investors, intensifying management’s focus on achieving 
financial targets, moderating volatility, achieving higher valuations, building a wider 
shareholder base, and increasing liquidity.8 As a consequence, we expect an association 
between guidance frequency and related measures of capital market benefits that have 
been used in prior literature to determine individual guidance issuances (Ajinkya et al. 
2005). 
However, building and maintaining a reputation is a costly process which is 
presumably justified by the long-term benefits that accrue from the reputation. The costs 
can vary depending on the attribute over which reputation is being built. One example 
involves underpricing high quality products (Shapiro 1983) and investing in advertising 
and marketing expenditures (Milgrom and Roberts 1986) to build a reputation for product 
quality. Other settings include different costs involved in building a reputation for being a 
good employer, or even overall corporate reputation.9   
                                                 
8 https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Corporate_Finance/Performance/Weighing_the_pros_and_cons_of_e
arnings_guidance__A_McKinsey_Survey_1752?pagenum=3#Exhibit3 
9 The process of building corporate reputations is tedious and time-consuming. Jack and Suzy Welch in 
their BusinessWeek column: the Welch Way state “[t]hat’s just the way it is with corporate reputations. 
They’re built annual report by annual report, career by career, crisis by crisis (because every company has 
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Prior literature has recognized the existence of proprietary costs to additional 
voluntary disclosures (Bamber and Cheon 1998). In the case of reputation for 
transparency through frequent guidance issuance, additional costs incurred include 
management and employee time allocated to the process of generating and conveying the 
guidance and the costs of improved information systems necessary to support effective 
forecasting. The same McKinsey (2006) survey of executives (mostly consisting of 
regular guiders) found that that over three-quarters of the executives stated that 
management time allocated to the guidance process was a significant cost (with over half 
responding that it was very time consuming). While some might believe that the internal 
forecast generation process is similar across firms and therefore all firms have the same 
information to disclose, the data suggests otherwise. The McKinsey (2006) survey 
suggests that there is cross-sectional variation in the amount that firms spend on their 
information systems to generate forecasts and the forecasting approach taken.10 Overall, 
firms seem quite different in their approach and commitment to generating forecasts. 
Furthermore, many forecasts designed for internal use do not include all elements 
necessary to forecast net earnings. Particularly important among these are many of the 
accruals and deferrals recorded at the end of the period. This suggests that firms must 
make additional investments in time and systems beyond that necessary for internal 
forecasting in order to regularly issue early, precise, and accurate forecasts.   
                                                                                                                                                 
one or two of them), and recovery by recovery.”  
http://www.businessweek.com/mediacenter/podcasts/welchway/welchway_09_04_06.htm?chan=search 
10 Hope (2006) discusses alternative approaches to generating forecasts and makes the case for why firms 
should adopt a rolling approach.  He also discusses Proctor and Gamble’s ‘stretch’ forecast approach as 
well as Tomkins’ “flash” forecasts and American Express’ use of rolling forecasts. He points to Borealis’s 
post-mortems of forecasts to learn from the errors and how to improve them. 
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While the costs discussed above are also likely to vary by firm, they are difficult 
to measure. We include traditional measures of proprietary costs in our analysis. As a 
rough measure of investments of management effort and costs of information system 
development, we suggest that firms making greater investments should have fewer 
material weaknesses in controls over financial reporting. These investments in the firm’s 
information environment are also likely to result in better mandatory disclosure quality 
such as a lower likelihood of earnings restatements and greater compliance with SEC 
reporting requirements, both of which are also likely to affect a firm’s reputation with 
capital markets participants.11 We also include these variables in our analysis.  
While there are other variables that could explain variation in reputation building 
efforts (e.g., corporate culture, accidental or historical reasons, management philosophy, 
etc.), these are even more difficult to directly measure. However, if reputation-building 
via disclosure transparency is part of a strategy to build overall corporate reputations, 
then firms that provide frequent guidance are likely to be concerned about their 
reputation in labor and product markets (Lange et al. 2010). Therefore, we use measures 
of labor and product market reputation to capture other cross-sectional differences in 
determinants of guidance strategy choice, and examine whether guidance frequency is 
associated with indicators for a firm’s reputation with its employees and customers, as 
well as capital markets participants.  
Based on the discussion above, the decision to build a reputation for transparency 
is determined by both the benefits and costs of providing guidance. However, prior 
research suggests that the relation between the determinants of reputation-building and 
                                                 
11 Consistent with this view, prior research suggests that there is an association between internal control 
quality and reported earnings (Doyle, Ge, and McVay 2007a, 2007b). 
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firms’ disclosure choices is likely to be endogenous. For example, while one of the 
benefits of increased disclosure is increased analyst following and institutional ownership, 
one can also argue that firms increase disclosure due to demands from these information 
intermediaries. Since a complete structural model based on the costs and benefits 
associated with disclosure choice has not been developed in the literature, it is difficult 
empirically to identify why firms desire to build a reputation for transparency. Similarly, 
while reputation concerns with employees and customers are unlikely to directly affect 
firms’ disclosure choices, they are likely to be associated with the desire to build an 
overall corporate reputation. To summarize, if frequent guidance is a revealed preference 
for transparent disclosure, it should be correlated with variables associated with 
reputation with capital market participants and reputation in labor and consumer markets. 
Therefore, our first hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H1: Disclosure frequency is positively correlated with variables associated with 
reputation with capital market participants and indicators of reputation with its employees 
and customers. 
We also expect these reputation variables to be closely related to the disclosure 
issuance decision in each period. As a consequence, in addition to our reputation 
variables, we also include established determinants of individual forecast issuances 
studied in prior work in our analysis. We discuss these in more detail in section 4.1. 
2.2 Guidance Frequency and Cross-Sectional Differences in Guidance Properties 
The prior section argues that frequent guiders are different from occasional 
guiders because of their desire to build a reputation for transparency. The desire to build a 
reputation should influence guidance properties because firms that are likely to issue 
11 
 
regular guidance have a greater incentive to expend effort and invest resources in the 
guidance issuance process to achieve reputational benefits, and to protect their reputation 
once it is established. These firms are also more likely to incorporate and benefit from 
feedback they receive from markets on the guidance issued. As a consequence, the 
guidance properties of frequent guiders are likely to be different from those of occasional 
guiders. 
Prior work indicates that investors and analysts respond more to accurate 
guidance as well as guidance with a tighter range (Hutton and Stocken 2009; Libby, Tan, 
and Hunton 2006). These studies show that firms with a more favorable guidance 
reputation experience a stronger reaction to their guidance issuances (Williams 1996; 
Hutton and Stocken 2009). In addition to the effects of issuing more accurate and specific 
guidance, a more timely disclosure allows the manager’s private information to be more 
quickly incorporated into prices and consequently reduces information asymmetries 
(King et al. 1990). Therefore, we suggest that timelier guidance (without sacrificing 
guidance accuracy) would be preferred. Given that frequent guiders desiring to build a 
reputation for transparency are likely to commit more resources to the guidance process 
and have the opportunity to learn from past guidance issuances, we expect these guiders 
to issue more accurate, specific, and timely guidance. 
H2: Compared to occasional guiders, frequent guiders issue more accurate and 
specific guidance, and issue that guidance earlier in the period. 
Prior work has also found that firms enjoy a premium for beating earnings 
forecasts (Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Bhojraj, Hribar, 
McInnis, and Picconi 2009), that analysts’ forecasts follow an optimistic-pessimistic 
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pattern over time (Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki 2004; Ke and Yu 2006; and Libby, 
Hunton, Tan, and Seybert 2008), and that bias in short-term management guidance 
contributes to this pattern (Baik and Jiang 2006; Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki 2006). These 
streams of work suggest that a pessimistic bias in short-term management guidance is 
desirable and advantageous. Despite these findings, prior work using a similar sample 
period shows that management guidance is on average optimistic (Bamber, Jiang, and 
Wang 2010), suggesting a natural tendency to be optimistic. The reputation-building 
argument would suggest that frequent guiders would be more likely to temper this 
observed average optimism. Frequent guiders are therefore likely to generate less 
optimistically biased guidance. The above discussion leads to our third hypothesis: 
H3: Compared to occasional guiders, frequent guiders issue less optimistic 
guidance. 
When deciding to issue guidance, frequent guiders, trying to build a reputation for 
transparency, are less likely to be constrained by the nature of news being disclosed. 
Skinner (1994) and Kasznik and Lev (1995) argue that one reason a firm issues guidance 
is the preemptive dissemination of bad news, thereby fending off potential litigation. 
Under this scenario firms are more likely to communicate bad news through guidance 
issuances.  In this setting, non-disclosure is likely to be interpreted as good news, though 
there is still uncertainty about the extent of good news, which the markets have to infer. 
But firms that are trying to build a reputation for transparency are likely not to limit 
themselves to disclosures aimed at reducing litigation but also focus on trying to better 
inform capital markets. Consistent with this argument, surveyed managers indicate that 
they will not initiate voluntary disclosures that are difficult to maintain in the future, 
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because the market expects firms to commit to the disclosure precedent (Graham et al. 
2005). Therefore, as a consequence of the desire to enhance their reputation for 
transparent reporting, frequent guiders are less likely to limit themselves to bad news 
guidance as compared with occasional guiders.12  This leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
H4:  Compared to occasional guiders, frequent guiders issue a greater proportion 
of guidance announcing good news. 
2.3 Learning and Improvement in Guidance over Time 
We also argue that frequent guiders are likely to be different from occasional 
guiders due to the benefits of learning from their history of guidance. Research in 
economics (Arrow 1962), psychology (Einhorn and Hogarth 1978), and management 
(Huber 1991; Zollo and Winter 2002) finds that individuals and organizations learn 
through experience when frequency and immediacy of feedback are high. Moreover, the 
learning-by-doing (LBD) model argues that the effort involved in executing a task is 
decreasing in cumulative experience. Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997) incorporate 
assumptions of the Learning-by-Doing model to show that analysts’ forecast accuracy 
improves with experience. Measures to improve the guidance process include (but are not 
limited to): hiring new talent with better experience, adopting new forecasting models, 
and carrying out periodic reviews (Hope 2006). Hope (2006) summarizes this argument 
succinctly when he states: 
                                                 
12 Early theories on discretionary disclosure suggested that firms will only disclose good news above a 
certain threshold (Verrecchia 1983; Dye 1985). A pooling mechanism enables managers to withhold news 
below the threshold because investors are uncertain about the managers’ information endowment and the 
proprietary costs of disclosure. In this setting, non-disclosure is likely to be interpreted as bad news. While 
more recent works suggests a predilection to issuing bad news forecasts, if this argument holds true we 
would expect occasional guiders to focus on good news forecasts and frequent guiders to not limit 
themselves to good news forecasts. Our evidence, discussed later, is consistent with the litigation 
hypothesis. 
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“Indeed, the only certainty about a forecast is that it will be wrong. The question 
is by how much. Narrowing that variation comes from learning, experience, decent 
information systems, and ultimately, judgment. The more practice managers have at 
preparing short term forecasts, the better they will become.” 
While both the reputation and learning hypotheses suggest that frequent guiders 
should have different guidance properties from the occasional guiders, only the learning 
hypothesis, which is by nature a dynamic concept, implies that firms’ guidance properties 
should improve over time with experience. Consistent with this view, prior research in 
strategic management and organizational studies argues that organizational learning 
generally results in positive consequences for firms (Levitt and March 1988; Teece, 
Pisano, and Shuen 1997). On the other hand, reputational considerations alone could lead 
to cross-sectional differences in firms’ guidance properties that are consistent with 
frequent guiders issuing higher quality guidance, but does not suggest that guidance 
properties should also evolve over time for firms that routinely provide guidance. 
Therefore, we also conduct within-firm time series analyses to examine whether the act 
of issuing guidance provides learning benefits beyond the reputation effect. Using each 
firm’s prior guidance as its own comparison, we conjecture that guidance is likely to 
become more accurate, specific, timely, and less optimistic as guidance experience 
increases. This leads to our final hypothesis:  
H5: Firms’ guidance issuances will become more accurate, specific, timely, and 
less optimistic over time. 
3. Sample Selection 
15 
 
 We begin with a sample of quarterly earnings forecasts in the First Call Company 
Issued Guidelines (CIG) file. The CIG file includes both quarterly and annual forecasts 
but we limit our sample to quarterly EPS guidance because feedback is more immediate 
in this setting. We identify each estimate as point, range, or open-ended following the 
guidelines in Anilowski, Feng, and Skinner (2007). We include only forecasts issued 
during the period from 1995 to 2005 and further restrict our observations to the first 
guidance issued if a firm guides more than once for a given quarter.13 After deleting all 
guidance revisions and earnings preannouncements, we merge the CIG file with 
Compustat and only retain firms with available data on Compustat and firms that are in 
existence (on Compustat) the entire period from the end of fiscal years 1995 to 2005. 
This requirement eliminates the possibility that our findings are attributable to a survival 
bias where poor performers are subsequently dropped out of our sample in later periods 
and therefore appear as occasional guiders.14 We then measure firms’ guidance frequency 
percentage (Frequency) by calculating the number of quarters in which a firm has issued 
quarterly guidance, divided by the number of quarters since their first guidance issuance 
to the end of our sample period. For example, if a firm issued guidance ten times since it 
first issued guidance in the first quarter of 2001, then their Frequency ratio would be 0.5. 
This results in a sample of 1,750 firms.   
                                                 
13 We do not consider revisions in our sample as we are interested in the number of “quarters” rather than 
the number of “times” a firm guides during 1995-2005. Our results are also similar when we use the last 
guidance issued each quarter. 
14 A recent study by Chuk, Matsumoto, and Miller (2009) finds that the CIG file may be incomplete. We 
examine the robustness of our results to alternative sample selection specifications. For example, we also 
conducted our analyses using the entire sample on the CIG file as well a restricted sample conditional on 
the firm issuing at least three forecasts in the past. The results using these alternative specifications are 
similar to those described in the main results.  
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 We also collect data from CRSP (returns data), IBES (analyst variables), 
Thomson (institutional ownership data), Audit Analytics (data on restatements and SEC 
comment letters), ACSI (customer satisfaction variable), Fortune (employee satisfaction 
variable), and data on internal control weaknesses. Of the 1,750 firms in our sample, 
1,501 firms have complete analyst and institutional ownership data, and is the main 
sample used in most of our analyses. 
Table 1 provides the number of management forecasts in our sample by sequence 
and year. The minimum (maximum) guidance frequency is 1 (32). 141 firms issued their 
first forecast in 1995 compared with 11 firms in 2005. The last row provides the total 
number of forecasts issued per year.  
[Insert Table 1] 
4. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Measures of Reputation-building 
We describe below the variables we use to examine our first hypothesis that 
guidance frequency is correlated with indicators of a firm’s reputation with its employees 
and customers, and variables associated with reputation with capital market participants.  
Employee Satisfaction (BestCompanies): Our proxy for firm reputation with employees is 
from Fortune’s list of “100 Best Companies to Work for in America (hereafter Best 
Companies).” The data begins in 1998 and is published in the first issue of Fortune 
magazine each year. The list is compiled from both employee responses to a 57-question 
survey and annual evaluations conducted by the Great Place to Work Institute in San 
Francisco. Factors that are considered include company demographics, employee benefits, 
culture, attitudes towards management, job satisfaction, and camaraderie. Fortune 
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magazine has no involvement in the selection decision and firms must apply to be 
considered on the list.15 BestCompanies is the number of years a firm is on the list during 
our sample period.16 
Customer Satisfaction (ACSI): Following prior studies on customer satisfaction (Fornell 
et al. 1996; Fornell, Mithas, Morgeson, and Krishnan 2006), we use data from the 
American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) to proxy for a firm’s reputation with its 
customers. The ACSI covers more than 200 companies and 45 industries each year, and 
the scores range from 0 to 100. Firms are selected based on total sales and represent a 
significant market share of the industry. The index adjusts the companies and industries 
covered based on changes in a firm’s market share and overall economy trends. The 
scores are calculated based on customer interviewing and econometric modeling. If a 
firm in our sample is not covered by the index, then we assume the industry score.17 
Internal Information Systems (MW): Firms that desire to build a reputation for providing 
quality forecasts are likely to invest more in their information systems, which should lead 
to better internal controls. Feng et al. (2009) find that firms with internal control 
weaknesses provide guidance with greater error because management relies on poor-
quality inputs to generate forecasts. We merge data on material weakness disclosures 
                                                 
15 Edmans (2011) examines the relation between employee satisfaction and long-run stock returns using the 
Best Companies list and finds that employee satisfaction is positively associated with long-run stock 
returns. See Edmans (2011) for further details about the list.  
16 Since Fortune.com only provides rankings for the last five years, we download the list from FACTIVA 
and manually match them with our sample firms based on TICKER. In untabulated results, we also use an 
indicator variable where BestCompanies equals 1 if the firm is on the list once during the sample period 
(zero otherwise) and find similar results.  
17 We download ACSI scores from their website and manually match them with our sample firms based on 
TICKER (http://www.theacsi.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12&Itemid=110.) In 
addition, because ACSI covers mainly business-to-consumer industries and services, we assign a value of 
zero for firms in industries that are not covered by ACSI. Moreover, the inferences of our results remain 
when we exclude ACSI from our analyses.  
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under Sections 302 and 404 from Doyle et al. (2007a, 2007b) with our sample firms and 
code firms that report at least one material weakness disclosure during 2002 to 2005 as 
MW equal to one, zero otherwise.18  
Reporting Quality (Comments and Restatements): Investments in information systems are 
also likely to result in better financial reporting quality, which should lead to a lower 
likelihood of receiving SEC comment letters and earnings restatements, both of which are 
likely to affect a firm’s reputation with capital market participants. The goal of SEC 
comment letters is to improve the quality of material disclosures to investors and whether 
or not a company receives a letter is likely a strong signal of its reporting quality (Chen 
and Johnston 2010). We merge in data on comment letters from Audit Analytics using 
the CIK code and identify firms that receive at least one letter as Comments equal to one, 
zero otherwise. Since SEC only releases comments with filing dates after August 2004, 
we complement this measure with restatement data from Audit Analytics. Restatements is 
the number of filings during 1995 to 2005. Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008) maintain 
that it is important to distinguish between restatements due to intentional irregularities 
and unintentional errors. They also show that restatements due to errors do not result in a 
significant negative market reaction during the 15-day announcement window. Therefore, 
we exclude filings due to errors, reclassifications, leases (SFAS 5), and derivatives 
(SFAS 133) because these filings are less likely to affect a firm’s financial reporting 
reputation.   
                                                 
18We use CUSIP to merge in internal control data (http://faculty.washington.edu/geweili/ICdata.html). As 
mentioned in Doyle et al. (2007a, 2007b), material weaknesses in internal control have only been disclosed 
widely in SEC filings since August 2002.  
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 Because each of the variables above is associated with a firm’s overall reputation, 
we compute a reputation score for each firm using the variables discussed above. This 
also increases the power of our analysis because each measure by itself covers a small 
group of companies. RepScore1 is the sum of BestCompanies and an indicator variable 
equal to one if ACSI is greater than the industry average, minus MW, Comments, and 
Restatements. For robustness, we also compute RepScore2 which is similar to RepScore1 
but excludes MW.  
Moreover, we also examine established determinants of firms’ disclosure 
decisions, which we also expect to affect the desire to build a reputation via guidance.   
Institutional Ownership (Inst): Firms’ incentives to build a reputation are likely to be 
affected by the degree of institutional ownership as institutional investors prefer firms 
with greater disclosure transparency. Ajinkya et al. (2005) examine the effect of 
institutional ownership on management guidance and find that firms with larger 
institutional ownership issue guidance more frequently. Therefore, we also control for 
institutional ownership (Inst) using the Thomson 13F file where institutional ownership is 
the percentage of common shares held by institutional owners in quarter t. We take the 
average of Inst across 44 quarters for our firm-level regressions. 
Analysts’ Information Environment (Num and Disp): We include the number of analysts 
following (Num) and the dispersion in analysts’ consensus forecasts (Disp) because we 
expect firms with reputational incentives to have higher analyst following and lower 
analyst dispersion (Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Lang and Lundholm 1996). Num and Disp are 
measured prior to guidance issuance (at the end of the quarter) for guidance (non-
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guidance) quarters, as reported on IBES. We take the average of Num and Disp across 44 
quarters for our firm-level regressions.  
Proprietary Costs (M/B): The costs of developing a reputation for disclosure transparency 
are likely to increase with proprietary costs. Therefore, we follow Bamber and Cheon 
(1998) and include market to book (M/B) as a proxy for proprietary costs.  
Size (Size): We proxy for size using the natural log of the market value of firm equity 
because prior studies find a positive association between firm size and firms’ disclosure 
decisions (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Ajinkya et al. 2005).  
4.2 Measures of Guidance Properties   
We examine the association between guidance frequency and several guidance 
properties including error, bias, specificity, and horizon. Error is the absolute difference 
between guidance and actual earnings, scaled by beginning assets-per-share.19 Bias is 
guidance minus actual earnings, scaled by beginning assets-per-share.20  Therefore, a 
positive value of Bias suggests that managers were optimistic in their forecasts. The 
Error and Bias variables are calculated using actual earnings reported in the First Call 
Actuals file to ensure consistency between management guidance and EPS realizations. 
Specificity is an ordinal variable for guidance specificity where point, range, open-ended, 
and qualitative guidance are coded as 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively. Horizon is the number 
of days between guidance issuance and the fiscal period end. PosNeg is the ratio of 
                                                 
19 The value of the guidance is either the point or open-ended estimate given by the manager or the mid-
point of the range estimate. We use the mid-point for range estimates because prior research suggests that 
investors use the mid-point when forming their expectations of earnings (Baginski, Conrad, and Hassell 
1993).  
20 Following Feng et al. (2009), we use beginning assets-per-share as our scalar. Our results do not change 
when we use beginning share price as an alternative scalar. 
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positive to negative guidance issuances for a firm during our sample period. 21  We 
conjecture that this ratio will be lower for occasional guiders who are more likely to 
provide guidance in the event of bad news and closer to unity for frequent guiders who 
are more likely to guide independent of news type. 
4.3 Explanatory and Control Variables  
We measure firms’ guidance frequency percentage (Frequency) by calculating the 
number of quarters in which a firm has issued quarterly guidance, divided by the number 
of quarters since their first guidance issuance to the end of our sample period. In our 
analysis, we use the frequency ratio of guidance issued as the quintile classification 
variable. This variable is chosen to best reflect the underlying constructs of our study, 
reputation-building and learning. Firms could decide to begin building a reputation at any 
time during the sample period, and therefore it is the proportion of times they guide once 
they begin guiding that would better reveal their preference for reputation-building. Our 
main independent variable, FreqQuintile, is the quintile rank of Frequency over our 
sample period, and we refer to firms in FreqQuintile5 as frequent guiders throughout the 
paper. We use several control variables drawn from prior research in our analysis.  
Analysts’ Expectations (MBAnalyst): Feng and Koch (2010) find that firms that 
disappointed analyst expectations in the past are more likely to stop issuing future 
guidance. Similarly, Cheng, Subramanyam, and Zhang (2006) find that frequent guiders 
are more likely to meet or beat analysts’ contemporaneous forecasts. Therefore, we also 
include an indicator variable equal to one if the firm meets or beats analysts’ consensus 
forecasts in the prior quarter. 
                                                 
21 Guidance issuances are classified as positive, negative, or no guidance surprises using the 
“CIGCODE_DESC” variable on First Call. 
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Industry Classification (HighTech): HighTech is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
firm is in the biotech, retailing, electronics, or computer industry. This variable is 
included to control for industry-specific information environments that affect firms’ 
disclosure decisions (Kim and Skinner 2011).  
Firm Performance (AnnRet and Loss): We proxy for performance using market-adjusted 
buy-and-hold returns for the twelve months ending in the prior fiscal period (AnnRet) as 
Chen, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal (2011) find that firms with poor stock performance in 
the past are more likely to discontinue guidance. We also control for whether a firm 
reported a loss in a specific quarter (Loss) because managers of loss firms have greater 
difficulty estimating earnings (Ajinkya et al. 2005).  
Economic Uncertainty (RetVol and EarnVol): Waymire (1985) finds that firms with 
volatile earnings issue forecasts less frequently. Earnings volatility (EarnVol) is defined 
as the volatility of seasonally adjusted earnings over twelve quarters ending in the current 
fiscal quarter, divided by median assets over the period. Following Hui, Matsunaga, and 
Morse (2009), we also use the standard deviation of twelve-month returns ending in the 
current fiscal period (RetVol) as a proxy for performance uncertainty. However, firms 
with high variability in their performance are also likely to disclose more frequently to 
assist investors’ valuations. 
Growth (P/E): We control for growth by including price to earnings (P/E) since it is 
possible that frequent guiders are more stable and mature firms.  
Conservatism (Cons): We also control for a firm’s financial reporting conservatism 
because Hui et al. (2009) find that firms with more conservative financial statements and 
variability in their performance issue guidance less frequently in subsequent periods. Our 
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measure of conservatism (Cons) is total accruals scaled by total assets in the prior fiscal 
period (Givoly and Hayn 2000). 
Firm Complexity (Segments): The number of business segments (Segments) proxies for 
firm complexity because firms with multiple product lines and subsidiaries are more 
likely to benefit from increased disclosures that help investors analyze the firm (Nagar et 
al. 2005). 
Market Risk (Beta): Following Bushee and Noe (2000), we also include a firm’s equity 
beta (Beta) as a proxy for market risk. 
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 provides univariate descriptive statistics on the determinants 
of reputation for the firms in the various quintiles. The average guidance frequency ratio 
is 0.05 for firms in FreqQuintile1 while firms in FreqQuintile5 are likely to guide three 
out of four quarters once they start issuing guidance. Forecasts is the number of times a 
firm issues guidance during the sample period. Firms in FreqQuintile1 on average issue 
one forecast during the sample period while this number is 17 for firms in FreqQuintile5. 
In terms of the relation between guidance frequency and the reputation variables, we find 
that more frequent guiders are more likely to be on Fortune’s list of “Best Companies to 
Work For”, score higher on the ACSI, and are less likely to disclose material internal 
control weaknesses. 22  The difference in means between firms in FreqQuintile1 and 
FreqQuintile5 is significant for BestCompanies (p<0.05), ACSI (p<0.01), and MW 
(p<0.05). The results for the composite reputation scores (RepScore1 and RepScore2) 
also suggest that firms in FreqQuintile1 and FreqQuintile5 are significantly different 
                                                 
22 Firms with missing ACSI scores are excluded from the univariate analysis of ACSI.  
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with frequent guiders scoring significantly higher on both metrics (p<0.01 and p<0.01). 
The results for institutional ownership and analysts are also consistent with the findings 
in prior research. Firms that issue guidance more frequently have higher institutional 
ownership (p<0.01) and greater analyst coverage (p<0.01). Frequent guiders also enjoy 
higher multiples (p<0.01), have lower analyst dispersion (p<0.01), and are larger in size 
(p<0.01).  
Panel B provides the pairwise correlation matrix for Frequency and the reputation 
variables. The univariate relation is significant for all but one of the reputation variables. 
Combined with the results discussed above, these findings suggest that Frequency is an 
appropriate proxy for the desire to build a reputation for disclosure transparency, as it is 
associated with other determinants of a firm’s reputation with capital market participants 
and indicators of reputation with its employees and customers. 
Panel C of Table 2 provides univariate descriptive statistics on the firm 
characteristics for the firms in the various quintiles. We find that several firm 
characteristics are significantly related to Frequency. Firms that issued guidance more 
frequently are more likely to meet or beat analysts’ consensus forecasts. Frequent guiders 
also have better performance with higher prior year returns and a lower likelihood of 
losses. The proxies for economic uncertainty also suggest that frequent guiders have 
lower economic uncertainty with lower return and earnings volatility. While these 
findings are consistent with frequent guiders being more mature and stable firms, their 
growth ratios suggests otherwise. Firms in FreqQuintile5 have significantly higher P/E 
ratios. We find that frequent guiders have more business segments but their reporting 
conservatism and market beta are not significantly different from that of occasional 
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guiders. Consistent with prior research, the findings from this analysis suggest that firms 
with reputational incentives are different from firms that issue guidance occasionally 
across several dimensions.  
[Insert Table 2] 
4.5 Guidance Frequency and Reputation-building 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that guidance frequency is positively correlated with 
indicators of a firm’s reputation with its employees and customers, and variables 
associated with reputation with capital market participants. Table 3 provides results for 
the multivariate analysis of this hypothesis. Our main variable of interest RepScore1 is 
positively related to guidance frequency (p<0.01) in column 1. In column 2, we control 
for established determinants of firms’ disclosure decisions and find that RepScore1 
continues to be significantly positive (p<0.01). We also examine whether guidance 
frequency is negatively associated with the costs of investments in reputation-building, 
proxied by MW. Consistent with our prediction, we find that MW is negatively associated 
with frequency (p<0.01) while RepScore2 continues to be positively associated with 
frequency (p<0.01) in all specifications. The coefficients on the established determinants 
of disclosure are all consistent with prior research. We find that firms with greater 
institutional ownership and greater analyst following are more likely to disclose 
frequently. Frequent guiders also have lower analyst forecast dispersion. Overall, the 
results in table 3 are consistent with guidance frequency being associated with measures 
of a firm’s reputation with its different constituents, the costs of investing in better 
information systems, and well-known determinants of firms’ disclosure decisions. 
[Insert Table 3] 
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5. Guidance Frequency and Guidance Properties 
 Section four provides strong evidence that frequent guiders are different from 
occasional guiders on many dimensions. In this section, we examine the relation between 
guidance frequency and the properties of the guidance.  
Table 4 provides univariate statistics on the properties of guidance issued by firms 
in each quintile.23 The frequent guiders (FreqQuintile5) display higher guidance accuracy 
with an average guidance error of 0.7% of beginning assets-per-share which is 
approximately one-sixth the level for firms in FreqQuintile1. Frequent guiders are also 
less optimistically biased than the occasional guiders even though they provide their 
guidance earlier in the quarter. Bias for firms in FreqQuintile5 is 0.2% as compared to 
3.6% of beginning assets-per-share for firms in FreqQuintile1. The statistics for Horizon, 
defined as the number of days between guidance issuance and the end of the fiscal period 
show that frequent guiders on average provide their first guidance 55 days prior to the 
end of the fiscal period as compared 36 days prior to the end of the fiscal period for the 
occasional guiders. Frequent guiders appear more likely to understand the earnings 
generation and disclosure process and therefore are willing to issue guidance earlier. 
While only suggestive of occasional guiders issuing guidance in the event of bad news, 
the ratio of positive to negative guidance surprises (PosNeg) is also significantly higher 
for firms in FreqQuintile5. While all groups are more likely to guide during periods of 
bad news (PosNeg<1), the ratio of 0.028 for FreqQuintile1 suggests that occasional 
guiders are thirty-five times more likely to guide during periods of bad news than periods 
                                                 
23 To ensure that our results are not driven by extreme outliers in the CIG dataset, we winsorize Error and 
Bias at the 1 and 99 percent levels. 
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of good news. Frequent guiders, however, are only twice as likely to guide in periods of 
bad news as periods of good news. 
[Insert Table 4] 
We carry out regressions at the firm level to test our second and third hypotheses 
that frequent guiders are likely to be less optimistic, more accurate and specific, and issue 
guidance earlier in the period compared to occasional guiders. The specifications are as 
follows (firm subscripts and intercept terms have been suppressed):  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11             /                            (1a)
Error Frequency MBAnalyst HighTech AnnRet Loss RetVol
EarnVol P E Cons Segments Beta
      
     
      
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0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11                    /   (1b)
Specificity Frequency MBAnalyst HighTech AnnRet Loss
RetVol EarnVol P E Cons Segments Beta
     
      
     
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     
      
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11           /                              (1d)
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EarnVol P E Cons Segments Beta
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     
      
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Hypothesis 4 suggests that the incentives to develop a reputation for transparent
 reporting should lead frequent guiders to issue guidance when there is good news. This 
suggests that conditional on firms having good or bad news, the propensity to provide 
guidance in a given quarter should vary for frequent and occasional guiders. Therefore, 
we examine whether the ratio of positive to negative surprises during the sample period is 
higher for frequent guiders using the following specification:
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11                /                         (1e)
PosNeg Frequency MBAnalyst HighTech AnnRet Loss RetVol
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One potential issue with examining the effect of frequency on guidance properties 
is that the coefficients on Frequency could be biased and inconsistent if Frequency is 
endogenous (i.e. correlated with the error term). For example, there might be omitted 
correlated variables (such as managerial talent) that affect both the decision to guide 
frequently and the properties of guidance issued. To mitigate this possibility, we carry out 
a two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis wherein the first stage involves a regression of 
guidance frequency on RepScore1, Inst, Num, Disp, M/B, Size, and an indicator variable 
for the year in which a firm begins issuing guidance.24 The predicted value from the first 
stage serves as an instrument for Frequency in the second stage. Table 5 provides results 
of the 2SLS regressions explaining guidance properties. The analysis is done using firm-
level average values.25 The univariate associations documented earlier continue to hold in 
the multivariate setting. Consistent with hypothesis 2, Frequency is negatively associated 
with Error ( 1 = -0.010, p < 0.01) and positively associated with Horizon ( 1 = 0.080, p 
< 0.05) and Specificity ( 1 = 0.876, p < 0.01). Consistent with hypothesis 3, Bias is 
negatively associated with Frequency ( 1 = -0.010, p < 0.01). Finally, consistent with 
                                                 
24 Firms that begin forecasting later in our sample period will have a higher Frequency ratio due to sample 
truncation. As such, we control for the year in which a firm begins forecasting to reduce the effect of 
overall time trends. Moreover, in untabulated analyses, we do not find any systematic differences in the 
year in which firms begin issuing guidance across the different Frequency quintiles. The average beginning 
year is either 1997 or 1998 for all quintiles, which suggests that the results are unlikely to be driven by a 
disproportionate number of late guidance-initiators falling into the top quintiles.  
25 The analysis is also carried out using firm-level median values with similar results.  
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occasional guiders being more likely to guide in the event of bad news (hypothesis 4), we 
also find a positive association between Frequency and PosNeg ( 1 = 0.495, p < 0.01). 
 The results for the control variables are generally consistent with prior studies. In 
particular, we find that firms with greater return volatility issue more inaccurate guidance. 
Firms that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts also tend to issue less optimistically biased 
guidance. We also find that firms with higher prior annual returns and loss firms issue 
guidance earlier in the period.26  
Overall, we present evidence that frequent guiders provide guidance of higher 
quality. Consistent with frequent guiders aspiring to build a reputation for enhanced 
disclosures and learning from their guidance experience, we find that their guidance 
issuances are more accurate, less optimistically biased, more specific, and issued earlier 
in the period. Frequent guiders are also more likely to provide guidance independent of 
news type, consistent with their incentives to build a reputation for transparent 
reporting.27 
[Insert Table 5] 
6. Learning over Time within Firms 
 The analysis thus far provides evidence of differences between frequent and 
occasional guiders using a cross-sectional design. Hypothesis 5 examines whether firms 
exhibit improvements in their guidance properties over time, which would be consistent 
with the effects of organizational learning. We utilize the traditional two-stage Heckman 
                                                 
26 We also carried out our analysis using a dichotomous variable OPT, where OPT is coded as equal to one 
if the management estimate is optimistically biased. The logit results are similar to the Bias findings. 
27 We use the ivregress command in STATA to estimate the regressions simultaneously and to generate 
correct residuals in the second stage.  
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procedure to control for a self-selection bias because guidance issuance is voluntary, and 
whether a firm discloses in a specific quarter is likely to be driven by time-varying 
factors, particularly for the occasional guiders. The analyses in this section are conducted 
at the firm-quarter level because we are interested in within-firm time-series changes. 
The Heckman two-stage approach is applied using the following specifications (firm and 
time subscripts have been suppressed): 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15
Pr( )
                    / /
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      
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Equation 2 is a probit model that estimates the likelihood of guidance occurrence 
where the dependent variable Occur is equal to one if the firm issues guidance in a given 
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quarter during the sample period. The explanatory variables include all of the firm 
characteristics (control variables) discussed in section 4.3 as well as Inst, Num, Disp, M/B, 
and Size. The variables are measured in the beginning of the quarter and the estimated 
parameters from this model are then used to calculate the inverse mills ratio (InvMills).28 
Equations 2a to 2d examine whether guidance properties improve over time, conditional 
on guidance issuance. Sequence, the main independent variable of interest, is the 
sequential order of guidance issuance. If firms learn to improve their guidance quality 
with repetition, then we expect guidance error and bias to decrease and specificity and 
timeliness to increase with Sequence. One issue with using the Sequence variable is that 
time trends are likely to play a role in the analysis since higher values of Sequence would 
occur in more recent time periods. Time trends are particularly important because 
changes could occur in guidance properties due to time-related factors that are not related 
to learning, such as change in accounting methods, improved computing power and 
information systems, and more general awareness of the guidance process.29 To control 
for overall time trends in the properties of guidance, we regress Sequence on a time effect 
to extract overall time trends, and then use the residual from this estimation as the main 
independent variable of interest in equations 2a to 2d. We also include industry fixed 
                                                 
28 We follow prior studies on earnings guidance and include the inverse mills ratio in the second stage. The 
inverse mill ratio approach is used to address self-selection issues due to unobservable effects by estimating 
a bias correction term in the first-stage through the guidance choice model and adding it to the second-stage 
outcome model. For example, if occasional guiders choose not to guide when managers have information 
that earnings uncertainty is high, then we would only observe guidance when firms have earnings that are 
easier to predict. Because the unobservable term is correlated with Sequence, this selection issue would bias 
the coefficients on Sequence, and lead us to conclude that learning occurs. 
29 While this is an issue to consider, it must also be noted that the time-related changes could occur both 
ways (i.e., improve or worsen guidance properties). To have a confounding effect on our results, the net 
effect of the time-related changes will have to result in an improvement in guidance properties. 
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effects and time indicators for the year in which a firm begins forecasting to control for 
industry-specific and time-related factors.30 
 
 Results for this analysis are presented in Table 6. As expected, Sequence is 
negatively associated with Error ( 1 = -0.001, p < 0.01) and Bias ( 1 = -0.001, p < 0.01), 
and positively associated with Specificity ( 1 = 0.006, p < 0.01) and Horizon ( 1 = 0.543, 
p < 0.01). This is consistent with frequent guiders issuing guidance with greater accuracy, 
specificity, and timeliness, and less optimistic bias over time. The coefficients on the 
control variables suggest that loss firms issue guidance with greater error, less specificity, 
and more optimistic bias while firms with greater analyst dispersion issue guidance with 
lower accuracy and specificity. Overall, the results in Table 6 suggest that firms’ 
guidance properties exhibit patterns that are consistent with the effect of learning.31 
[Insert Table 6] 
7. Summary 
 This paper attempts to further our understanding of guidance behavior by firms. 
The study differs from previous and contemporaneous work in several ways. First, we 
draw on research on corporate reputation in several streams of literature and provide 
evidence that guidance frequency is associated with variables related to a firm’s 
reputation with its different constituents. Second, unlike most prior work, we examine 
                                                 
30 Larcker and Rusticus (2010) emphasize that to successfully control for endogeneity, at least one of the 
instruments identified in the first stage must be uncorrelated with the dependent variable in the second 
stage. In our analyses, this variable is the number of analysts following (Num). Following Feng et al. 
(2009), we exclude Num from the second stage regressions in our tests of equations 1a to 1e and 2a to 2d.  
31 For robustness, we adopt an alternative design and adjust for the median guidance error, bias, specificity, 
and horizon of the occasional guiders in the same calendar quarter. We then regress the differences between 
these two groups on a time variable and find that the untabulated results continue to hold. The occasional 
guiders serve as a natural control group because their maximum number of forecasts is two, which suggests 
that they are less likely to benefit from learning, and that their forecasts reflect time-related changes.  
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whether a firm’s guidance frequency is an important determinant of its guidance 
properties. Our results suggest that the characteristics of guidance issued by occasional 
and frequent guiders differ. Compared to occasional guiders, frequent guiders issue 
guidance in a timelier manner and their guidance issuances are less optimistic, more 
accurate, and more specific, consistent with their reputational incentives and the effect of 
learning. Frequent guiders also appear to benefit from the experience of providing 
guidance, as evidenced by improvements in guidance accuracy, specificity, and 
timeliness. While our results are consistent with an improvement in firms’ guidance 
quality over time, we are unable to examine how firms learn. Lastly, we find that frequent 
guiders are more likely to issue both good and bad news guidance compared to 
occasional guiders, who are significantly more likely to disclose only bad news. 
 Our results are consistent with frequency being an important classificatory 
variable, with frequent guiders representing a class or type of firm that develop a 
reputation for enhanced disclosures through their guidance and therefore have different 
incentives and processes that affect the properties of the guidance and learning over time.
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Table 1 Distribution of Management Guidance 1995‐2005 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  Total  Row% 
1  141  109  139  117 134 129 134 48 19 23  11  1004  10.75%
2  30  45  45  151 119 147 211 74 37 35  16  910  9.75%
3  6  2  22  71 87 131 223 115 60 37  21  775  8.30%
4    1  12  30 66 99 200 146 72 61  23  710  7.60%
5      4  15 42 66 181 151 93 57  39  648  6.94%
6      1  11 22 48 131 168 102 64  34  581  6.22%
7        4 11 34 107 145 121 69  46  537  5.75%
8        2 11 18 67 141 121 82  51  493  5.28%
9          8 9 44 136 113 106  46  462  4.95%
10          3 6 32 98 116 107  54  416  4.45%
11          1 7 21 74 110 123  59  395  4.23%
12            5 15 41 113 113  79  366  3.92%
13            3 10 32 92 117  83  337  3.61%
14            2 5 22 71 114  90  304  3.26%
15              5 17 51 103  89  265  2.84%
16              3 12 31 89  97  232  2.48%
17              2 6 22 79  84  193  2.07%
18                5 17 61  86  169  1.81%
19                3 13 40  80  136  1.46%
20                2 8 26  77  113  1.21%
21                1 6 19  66  92  0.99%
22                  2 18  43  63  0.67%
23                  2 11  27  40  0.43%
24                  2 7  21  30  0.32%
25                  1 5  15  21  0.22%
26                    2  15  17  0.18%
27                    2  11  13  0.14%
28                    1  6  7  0.07%
29                      6  6  0.06%
30                      1  1  0.01%
31                      1  1  0.01%
32                      1  1  0.01%
Total  177  157  223  401 504 704 1391 1437 1395 1571  1378  9338  
Column%  1.90%  1.68%  2.39%  4.29% 5.40% 7.54% 14.90% 15.39% 14.94% 16.82%  14.76%    
The row (column) indicates the sequence (year) of guidance issuance. The minimum (maximum) number 
of guidance issuances for our sample firms during 1995‐2005 is 1 (32). 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A Determinants of Guidance Reputation 
Variable  Mean  Median  Min  Max  Std Dev  Difference in 
Means 
Frequency       
FreqQuintile1  0.046  0.045  0.025  0.071  0.014 
FreqQuintile2  0.108  0.105  0.074  0.148  0.021 
FreqQuintile3  0.210  0.205  0.150  0.297  0.041 
FreqQuintile4  0.418  0.419  0.300  0.553  0.074 
FreqQuintile5  0.752  0.714  0.556  1.000  0.141  p<0.01 
Forecasts       
FreqQuintile1  1.205  1.000  1.000  2.000  0.405 
FreqQuintile2  2.741  3.000  1.000  5.000  1.123 
FreqQuintile3  5.508  5.000  1.000  11.000  2.280 
FreqQuintile4  11.236  11.000  1.000  22.000  4.803 
FreqQuintile5  16.903  18.000  1.000  32.000  6.473  p<0.01 
BestCompanies       
FreqQuintile1  0.115  0.000  0.000  7.000  0.747 
FreqQuintile2  0.085  0.000  0.000  7.000  0.586 
FreqQuintile3  0.117  0.000  0.000  8.000  0.818 
FreqQuintile4  0.203  0.000  0.000  8.000  1.040 
FreqQuintile5  0.291  0.000  0.000  8.000  1.272  p<0.05 
ACSI       
FreqQuintile1  0.745  0.724  0.624  0.825  0.051 
FreqQuintile2  0.752  0.725  0.656  0.860  0.052 
FreqQuintile3  0.760  0.758  0.630  0.840  0.055 
FreqQuintile4  0.765  0.760  0.610  0.882  0.054 
FreqQuintile5  0.761  0.760  0.668  0.855  0.049  p<0.01 
MW       
FreqQuintile1  0.148  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.356 
FreqQuintile2  0.158  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.365 
FreqQuintile3  0.156  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.364 
FreqQuintile4  0.157  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.364 
FreqQuintile5  0.097  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.296  p<0.05 
Comments       
FreqQuintile1  0.307  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.462 
FreqQuintile2  0.372  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.484 
FreqQuintile3  0.291  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.455 
FreqQuintile4  0.305  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.461 
FreqQuintile5  0.269  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.444  p=0.12 
Restatements       
FreqQuintile1  0.436  0.000  0.000  5.000  0.773 
FreqQuintile2  0.504  0.000  0.000  4.000  0.818 
FreqQuintile3  0.355  0.000  0.000  5.000  0.661 
FreqQuintile4  0.418  0.000  0.000  5.000  0.783 
FreqQuintile5  0.352  0.000  0.000  4.000  0.696  p=0.12 
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Panel A (cont’d) Determinants of Guidance Reputation 
 
Variable  Mean  Median  Min  Max  Std Dev  Difference in 
Means 
RepScore1       
FreqQuintile1  ‐0.742  ‐1.000  ‐5.000  7.000  1.309   
FreqQuintile2  ‐0.918  ‐1.000  ‐6.000  6.000  1.378   
FreqQuintile3  ‐0.662  ‐1.000  ‐5.000  8.000  1.341   
FreqQuintile4  ‐0.629  ‐1.000  ‐6.000  7.000  1.540   
FreqQuintile5  ‐0.352  0.000  ‐4.000  12.000  1.711  p<0.01 
RepScore2       
FreqQuintile1  ‐0.595  0.000  ‐5.000  7.000  1.188   
FreqQuintile2  ‐0.761  ‐1.000  ‐5.000  6.000  1.224   
FreqQuintile3  ‐0.506  0.000  ‐5.000  8.000  1.225   
FreqQuintile4  ‐0.473  0.000  ‐5.000  7.000  1.434   
FreqQuintile5  ‐0.255  0.000  ‐4.000  12.000  1.652  p<0.01 
Inst       
FreqQuintile1  0.393  0.366  0.005  0.936  0.235 
FreqQuintile2  0.486  0.493  0.016  0.959  0.222 
FreqQuintile3  0.535  0.562  0.006  0.990  0.207 
FreqQuintile4  0.578  0.622  0.023  0.930  0.209 
FreqQuintile5  0.624  0.659  0.001  0.952  0.187  p<0.01 
Num       
FreqQuintile1  4.259  2.605  1.000  24.448  4.500 
FreqQuintile2  5.137  3.591  1.000  23.615  4.353 
FreqQuintile3  6.612  4.897  1.000  33.326  5.294 
FreqQuintile4  7.295  5.329  1.000  30.295  5.625 
FreqQuintile5  8.545  7.045  1.000  31.167  5.926  p<0.01 
Disp       
FreqQuintile1  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.067  0.005 
FreqQuintile2  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.018  0.003 
FreqQuintile3  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.025  0.003 
FreqQuintile4  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.034  0.002 
FreqQuintile5  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.005  0.001  p<0.01 
M/B       
FreqQuintile1  2.786  2.154  ‐3.464  18.005  2.706 
FreqQuintile2  2.546  2.065  ‐3.464  18.005  2.220 
FreqQuintile3  2.991  2.278  ‐3.464  18.005  2.901 
FreqQuintile4  3.498  2.572  ‐3.464  18.005  3.125 
FreqQuintile5  3.606  2.901  ‐3.464  18.005  2.816  p<0.01 
Size       
FreqQuintile1  5.374  5.016  1.288  11.663  2.055 
FreqQuintile2  5.962  5.846  1.160  11.588  1.826 
FreqQuintile3  6.317  6.263  1.982  11.836  1.902 
FreqQuintile4  6.661  6.449  2.129  11.830  1.745 
FreqQuintile5  7.073  7.066  1.587  12.541  1.669  p<0.01 
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The sample consists of 1,501 firms between 1995 and 2005. Frequency is the number of quarters in which 
a firm has issued quarterly guidance, divided by the number of quarters since their first guidance issuance 
to the end of our sample period. FreqQuintile is the quintile rank of guidance frequency. Forecasts is the 
number of  forecasts  issued during  the sample period. BestCompanies  is  the number of years  firm  is on 
Fortune’s  list of “Best Companies to Work For.” ACSI  is firm’s average score on the American Customer 
Satisfaction  Index.  MW  is  an  indicator  variable  equal  to  one  if  firm  disclosed  a  material  weakness. 
Comments  is an  indicator variable equal to one  if firm received an SEC comment  letter. Restatements  is 
the  number  of  financial  restatements.  RepScore1  is  the  sum  of  (1  if ACSI  is  greater  than  the  industry 
average, BestCompanies, MW*‐1, Comments*‐1, Restatements*‐1). RepScore2  is the sum of (1  if ACSI  is 
greater  than  the  industry average, BestCompanies, Comments*‐1, Restatements*‐1).  Inst  is  institutional 
ownership. Num  is number of  analysts  following. Disp  is  analyst  forecast dispersion. M/B  is market  to 
book. Size is the natural log of market value. Descriptive statistics are reported at the firm level using firm 
averages over the 11‐year sample period. See Appendix for variable definitions. The last column presents 
p‐values  based  on  two‐tailed  tests  comparing  the  difference  in  means  between  FreqQuintile1  and 
FreqQuintile5.  
 
42 
 
Panel B Pairwise Correlations 
 
  Frequency  BestCompanies ACSI  MW  Comments Restatements  Inst  Num  Disp  M/B  Size 
Frequency  1.00  0.09  0.11  ‐0.06  ‐0.05  ‐0.03  0.29  0.25  ‐0.20  0.02  0.26 
    <0.01  <0.01  <0.05  <0.05  0.22  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01  0.44  <0.01 
BestCompanies  0.09  1.00  0.06  ‐0.03  ‐0.01  ‐0.05  0.06  0.32  ‐0.08  0.01  0.27 
  <0.01    <0.05  0.19  0.68  <0.05  <.05  <0.01  <0.01  0.57  <0.01 
ACSI  0.15  0.08  1.00  0.05  0.13  0.06  0.08  0.07  ‐0.08  0.05  0.05 
  <0.01  <0.01    0.13  <0.01  <0.05  <0.05  <0.05  <0.04  <0.10  0.15 
MW  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  0.06  1.00  0.09  0.28  ‐0.01  ‐0.09  0.09  0.07  ‐0.09 
  <0.10  <0.10  <0.10    <0.01  <0.01  0.55  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01 
Comments  ‐0.04  0.00  0.16  0.09  1.00  0.10  ‐0.05  0.04  0.04  ‐0.02  ‐0.03 
  <0.10  0.87  <0.01  <0.01    <0.01  <0.05  0.16  <0.10  0.41  0.29 
Restatements  ‐0.02  ‐0.03  0.10  0.29  0.10  1.00  0.03  ‐0.07  0.08  0.02  ‐0.07 
  0.43  0.18  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01    0.21  <0.01  <0.01  0.52  <0.01 
Inst  0.34  0.09  0.09  ‐0.02  ‐0.06  0.02  1.00  0.42  ‐0.19  0.00  0.57 
  <0.01  <0.01  <0.05  0.52  <0.05  0.38    <0.01  <0.01  0.97  <0.01 
Num  0.34  0.26  0.10  ‐0.08  0.00  ‐0.04  0.54  1.00  ‐0.19  0.06  0.77 
  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01  0.99  <0.10  <0.01    <0.01  <0.05  <0.01 
Disp  ‐0.27  ‐0.20  ‐0.05  0.16  0.06  0.12  ‐0.26  ‐0.41  1.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.24 
  <0.01  <0.01  0.13  <0.01  <0.05  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01    0.81  <0.01 
M/B  0.19  0.19  0.23  ‐0.01  0.02  ‐0.02  0.13  0.42  ‐0.36  1.00  0.04 
  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01  0.52  0.47  0.46  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01    <0.10 
Size  0.31  0.26  0.07  ‐0.10  ‐0.04  ‐0.08  0.57  0.80  ‐0.41  0.32  1.00 
  <0.01  <0.01  <0.05  <0.01  <0.10  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01   
 
This panel displays correlation coefficients and significance values for Frequency and the reputation variables. Pearson (Spearman) correlations are provided in 
the upper (lower) diagonal. The sample consists of 1,501 firms between 1995 and 2005. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Panel C Firm Characteristics 
 
Variable  FreqQuintile1  FreqQuintile2  FreqQuintile3  FreqQuintile4  FreqQuintile5  Difference in Means Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
MBAnalyst  0.438  0.439  0.489  0.500  0.519  0.523  0.539  0.535  0.573  0.583  <0.01
HighTech  0.036  0.000  0.045  0.000  0.034  0.000  0.110  0.000  0.161  0.000  <0.01
AnnRet  0.083  0.069  0.116  0.085  0.126  0.080  0.146  0.087  0.148  0.096  <0.01
Loss  0.277  0.205  0.228  0.159  0.239  0.182  0.193  0.114  0.145  0.091  <0.01
RetVol  0.140  0.127  0.125  0.117  0.132  0.123  0.128  0.118  0.115  0.108  <0.01
EarnVol  0.314  0.017  0.043  0.013  0.292  0.016  0.043  0.013  0.030  0.013  0.22
P/E  12.247  12.833  15.586  14.392  15.518  14.809  17.846  17.338  22.249  20.135  <0.01
Cons  ‐0.019  ‐0.007  ‐0.007  ‐0.004  ‐0.011  ‐0.005  ‐0.014  ‐0.010  ‐0.017  ‐0.007  0.87
Segments  4.881  4.000  5.285  5.000  5.622  4.636  5.476  4.909  5.434  4.500  0.02
Beta  1.064  0.877  1.151  1.027  1.310  1.089  1.284  1.161  1.154  1.050  0.10
 
The sample consists of 1,501 firms between 1995 and 2005. Frequency is the number of quarters in which a firm has issued quarterly guidance, divided by the 
number of quarters since their  first guidance  issuance to the end of our sample period. FreqQuintile  is the quintile rank of guidance  frequency. Descriptive 
statistics  are  reported at  the  firm  level using  firm  averages over  the 11‐year  sample period.  See Appendix  for other  variable definitions. The  last  column 
presents p‐values based on two‐tailed tests comparing the difference in means between FreqQuintile1 and FreqQuintile5.  
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Table 3 Guidance Frequency and Reputation‐building 
 
Frequency  Frequency  Frequency  Frequency  Frequency 
   
RepScore1  0.028***  0.013***     
(0.005)  (0.005)     
RepScore2  0.028***  0.024***  0.010** 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
MW  ‐0.061***  ‐0.038** 
(0.017)  (0.018) 
Inst  0.210***    0.208*** 
(0.038)    (0.038) 
Num  0.006***    0.006*** 
(0.002)    (0.002) 
Disp  ‐9.439***    ‐9.326*** 
(3.209)    (2.336) 
M/B  ‐0.000    0.000 
(0.000)    (0.000) 
Size  0.012    0.012* 
(0.007)    (0.007) 
R‐squared  0.158  0.257  0.153  0.159  0.258 
 
This  table  presents  OLS  tests  of  the  association  between  guidance  frequency  and  determinants  of 
reputation.  The  sample  consists  of  1,501  firms  between  1995  and  2005.  Frequency  is  the  number  of 
quarters  in which a firm has  issued quarterly guidance, divided by the number of quarters since their first 
guidance  issuance to the end of our sample period. RepScore1  is the sum of  (1  if ACSI  is greater than the 
industry average, BestCompanies, MW*‐1, Comments*‐1, Restatements*‐1). RepScore2  is  the sum of  (1  if 
ACSI  is greater  than  the  industry average, BestCompanies, Comments*‐1, Restatements*‐1). ACSI  is  firm’s 
average score on the American Customer Satisfaction  Index. BestCompanies  is the number of years firm  is 
on Fortune’s list of “Best Companies to Work For“. MW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm disclosed 
a material weakness. Comments is an indicator variable equal to one if firm received an SEC comment letter. 
Restatements  is  the number of  financial  restatements.  Inst  is  institutional ownership. Num  is number of 
analysts  following. Disp  is  analyst  forecast  dispersion. M/B  is market  to  book.  Size  is  the  natural  log  of 
market  value.  Industry  and  year  fixed  effects  indicating  the  year  in which  a  firm  begins  forecasting  are 
included. Coefficients marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p< .10, .05, or .01, respectively, using a 
two‐tailed test. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4 Guidance Frequency and Guidance Properties 
 
The sample consists of 1,501 firms between 1995 and 2005. Frequency is the number of quarters in which 
a firm has issued quarterly guidance, divided by the number of quarters since their first guidance issuance 
to  the  end  of  our  sample  period.  FreqQuintile  is  the  quintile  rank  of  guidance  frequency. Descriptive 
statistics are reported at the firm level using firm averages over the 11‐year sample period. See Appendix 
for other variable definitions. The last column presents p‐values based on two‐tailed tests comparing the 
difference in means between FreqQuintile1 and FreqQuintile5. 
Variable  Mean  Median  Min  Max  Std Dev  Difference in 
Means 
Error       
FreqQuintile1  0.043  0.005  0.000  3.422  0.249 
FreqQuintile2  0.021  0.003  0.000  1.494  0.112 
FreqQuintile3  0.011  0.004  0.000  0.469  0.032 
FreqQuintile4  0.007  0.003  0.000  0.191  0.015 
FreqQuintile5  0.007  0.003  0.000  0.138  0.014  p<0.01 
Specificity       
FreqQuintile1  2.648  3.000  1.000  4.000  1.027 
FreqQuintile2  2.705  3.000  1.000  4.000  0.695 
FreqQuintile3  2.846  3.000  1.000  4.000  0.530 
FreqQuintile4  2.989  3.000  1.071  4.000  0.394 
FreqQuintile5  3.046  3.000  1.583  4.000  0.282  p<0.01 
Horizon       
FreqQuintile1  35.978  17.500  0.000  389.000  51.406 
FreqQuintile2  43.833  34.667  0.000  312.000  43.689 
FreqQuintile3  53.644  45.071  0.000  333.000  42.140 
FreqQuintile4  57.962  52.675  1.000  326.462  34.912 
FreqQuintile5  55.109  55.636  8.000  227.800  19.832  p<0.01 
Bias       
FreqQuintile1  0.036  0.002  ‐0.059  3.422  0.245 
FreqQuintile2  0.001  0.001  ‐0.535  0.208  0.047 
FreqQuintile3  0.005  0.001  ‐0.054  0.469  0.030 
FreqQuintile4  0.003  0.001  ‐0.071  0.191  0.013 
FreqQuintile5  0.002  0.000  ‐0.045  0.101  0.009  p<0.01 
PosNeg       
FreqQuintile1  0.028  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.167 
FreqQuintile2  0.109  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.282 
FreqQuintile3  0.347  0.000  0.000  4.000  0.639 
FreqQuintile4  0.387  0.200  0.000  4.000  0.589 
FreqQuintile5  0.509  0.333  0.000  6.000  0.702  p<0.01 
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Table 5 Guidance Frequency and Guidance Properties: 2SLS 
 
  Error  Specificity  Horizon  Bias  PosNeg 
           
Frequency  ‐0.010***  0.876***  0.080***  ‐0.010***  0.495*** 
  (0.003)  (0.179)  (0.029)  (0.004)  (0.169) 
MBAnalyst  ‐0.000  0.019  0.007  ‐0.004**  0.248** 
  (0.002)  (0.103)  (0.017)  (0.002)  (0.113) 
HighTech  ‐0.000  0.051  ‐0.026**  0.001  ‐0.051 
  (0.001)  (0.067)  (0.011)  (0.001)  (0.062) 
AnnRet  0.004**  0.024  0.053***  0.007***  0.196* 
  (0.002)  (0.101)  (0.016)  (0.002)  (0.111) 
Loss  0.001  ‐0.203  0.075***  ‐0.006***  ‐0.197 
  (0.002)  (0.130)  (0.021)  (0.002)  (0.136) 
RetVol  0.052***  ‐0.357  ‐0.035  0.009  0.842 
  (0.010)  (0.538)  (0.087)  (0.010)  (0.587) 
EarnVol  ‐0.000  0.014**  0.000  ‐0.000  ‐0.015 
  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.070) 
P/E  0.000*  ‐0.001*  0.000  0.000  ‐0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Cons  ‐0.009**  0.106  ‐0.027  0.004  ‐0.853** 
  (0.004)  (0.241)  (0.039)  (0.004)  (0.420) 
Segments  0.000  ‐0.006  0.000  ‐0.000  0.011** 
  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.005) 
Beta  ‐0.000  ‐0.042  ‐0.005  ‐0.000  ‐0.018 
  (0.001)  (0.028)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.028) 
Constant  0.002  2.780***  0.093***  0.008***  ‐0.114 
  (0.002)  (0.090)  (0.015)  (0.002)  (0.102) 
           
R‐squared  0.082  0.034  0.050  0.022  0.080 
 
This table presents 2SLS tests of the association between guidance frequency and guidance properties. The 
sample consists of 1,501 firms between 1995 and 2005. The IV specification uses the predicted value from 
regressing Frequency on RepScore1, Inst, Num, Disp, M/B, and Size with year fixed effects indicating the first 
year  in which a  firm begins  forecasting  in  the  first‐stage as an  instrumental variable  for Frequency  in  the 
second‐stage  regressions. The  results  in  the  table  reflect  the  second‐stage  regressions.  See Appendix  for 
variable definitions. Horizon is divided by 365 for expositional purposes. Coefficients marked with a *, **, or 
***  are  significant  at p<  .10,  .05, or  .01,  respectively, using  a  two‐tailed  test. Robust  standard  errors  in 
parentheses. 
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Table 6 Heckman Two‐Stage Estimation of the Trends in Guidance Properties 
         
  Error  Specificity  Horizon  Bias 
Sequence  ‐0.001***  0.006***  0.543***  ‐0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.087)  (0.000) 
Size  0.001**  ‐0.019**  ‐0.781  0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.494)  (0.000) 
AnnRet  0.001**  0.044***  3.166***  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.016)  (0.919)  (0.001) 
Loss  0.001***  ‐0.112***  0.769  0.001** 
  (0.001)  (0.027)  (1.597)  (0.000) 
RetVol  0.005  ‐0.503***  ‐37.713***  ‐0.007* 
  (0.005)  (0.194)  (10.116)  (0.004) 
EarnVol  0.001  0.038  4.835  ‐0.007 
  (0.003)  (0.150)  (14.461)  (0.005) 
M/B  0.000  ‐0.000*  ‐0.001  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
P/E  0.000  ‐0.000  0.003  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000) 
Cons  ‐0.002  ‐0.134  ‐4.590  ‐0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.102)  (6.429)  (0.002) 
Beta  ‐0.000  0.001  0.604  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.398)  (0.000) 
Inst  0.001  0.127*  1.014  0.002* 
  (0.001)  (0.071)  (3.696)  (0.001) 
Disp  0.338***  ‐7.410**  ‐54.175  0.022 
  (0.081)  (3.510)  (131.701)  (0.140) 
InvMills  0.005***  ‐0.191***  ‐2.712  0.003*** 
  (0.001)  (0.064)  (3.288)  (0.001) 
         
Observations  8445  9308  9308  8445 
R‐squared  0.160  0.111  0.148  0.164 
 
The Heckman procedure consists of a first‐stage probit estimation of the likelihood of guidance occurrence 
and a second‐stage OLS estimation of the effect of guidance sequence on guidance properties. The results in 
the table reflect the second‐stage regressions. Industry and quarter fixed effects are included. See Appendix 
for variable definitions. Horizon is divided by 365 for expositional purposes. Coefficients marked with a *, **, 
or *** are significant at p<  .10,  .05, or  .01, respectively, using a two‐tailed test. Robust standard errors  in 
parentheses.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Frequency  Number of quarters in which a firm has issued quarterly guidance, divided by the number of quarters since their first guidance 
issuance to the end of our sample period, as reported on the First Call CIG file. 
FreqQuintile  Quintile rank of Frequency.
Forecasts  Number of forecasts a firm issued during the sample period.
Sequence  Ordinal sequence of guidance issuances during the sample period.
   
Guidance Properties   
Error  Absolute difference between actual EPS and management guidance, scaled by beginning assets‐per‐share.
Specificity  Ordinal variable for guidance specificity where point, range, open‐ended, and qualitative guidance are coded as 4, 3, 2, and 1, 
respectively. 
Horizon  Number of days between management guidance issuance date and end of fiscal quarter.
Bias  Guidance minus actual EPS, scaled by beginning assets‐per‐share. A positive (negative) value indicates management optimism 
(pessimism). 
PosNeg  Ratio of positive to negative guidance issuances during the sample period. 
   
Reputation Variables   
BestCompanies  Reputation among employees proxied by the number of years a firm is listed on the Fortune “100 Best Places to Work For” list from 
1998 to 2005.  
ACSI  Reputation among customers proxied by a firm’s average score on the American Customer Satisfaction Index from 1995 to 2005. 
MW  Indicator variable coded as 1 if firm disclosed a material internal control weakness from August 2002 to October 2005, 0 otherwise. 
Comments  Indicator variable coded as 1 if firm received a comment letter from the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2004 and 2005, 0 
otherwise. 
Restatements  Number of financial statement restatements as reported on AuditAnalytics during sample period.
RepScore1  Sum of (1 if ACSI greater than industry average, BestCompanies, MW*‐1, Comments*‐1, Restatements*‐1)  
RepScore2  Sum of (1 if ACSI greater than industry average, BestCompanies, Comments*‐1, Restatements*‐1)  
Inst  Percentage of common shares owned by institutional investors in quarter t. 
Num  Number of analysts following prior to guidance issuance in quarter t, or number of analysts following the firm at the end of the quarter 
for non‐guidance quarters, as reported on IBES.  
Disp  Standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts prior to guidance issuance in quarter t, or standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts at the end 
of the quarter for non‐guidance quarters. 
M/B  Market to book in quarter t.
Size  Logged market value of equity in quarter t.
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Control Variables   
MBAnalyst  Indicator variable coded as 1 if firm meets or beats analysts’ prevailing consensus forecasts in quarter t‐1.
HighTech  Indicator variable coded as 1 if firm is in the biotech, retailing, electronics, or computer industry in quarter t, and zero otherwise.
AnnRet  Market‐adjusted buy‐and‐hold twelve‐month returns in quarter t‐1.
Loss  Indicator variable coded as 1 if firm reports a loss in quarter t, 0 otherwise. 
RetVol  Standard deviation of twelve‐month returns in quarter t.
EarnVol  Standard deviation of seasonally‐adjusted quarterly earnings over 12 quarters ending in quarter t, divided by median assets over the 
12 quarters. 
P/E  Price to earnings in quarter t.
Cons  Financial reporting conservatism proxied by total accruals scaled by total assets in year t‐1.
Segments  Number of business segments in quarter t.
Beta  Equity beta in quarter t.
